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Abstract 
The proliferation of small arms and light weapons is one of the major security challenges currently facing 
Nigeria, Africa and indeed the world in general. The trafficking and wide availability of these weapons fuel 
communal conflict, political instability and pose a threat, not only to national security, but also to sustainable 
development. The widespread proliferation of small arms is contributing to alarming levels of armed crime, and 
militancy. Therefore, the trust of this paper dwell on scanning the role of government and policy makers, in 
checking SALW in Nigeria and to ascertain the level of insecurity this menace had incurred in the Nigerian state. 
It was revealed that inability of the Nigeria government and the law enforcement agencies to check the supply 
and the demand factors of the proliferation of SALW in Nigeria has heightened and worsened the security 
situations in the country. The paper further asserts that availability of small arms have direct influence on the 
escalation and sustenance of insecurity and therefore, drew a conclusion on the basis of which the 
recommendations were made. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between small arms and insecurity has been the object of contentious debates among scholars. 
While some scholars argue that small arms are the direct cause of insecurity, others maintain that small arms are 
merely trigger of insecurity or precipitating factor. Despite this seeming apparent disagreement, both scholars 
commonly agree that the proliferation of small arms poses serious challenges to the sustenance of peace and 
stability of any society. They further assert that availability of small arms have direct influence on the escalation 
and sustenance of insecurity. In his famous year 2000 millennium report to the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA), the then Secretary General, Kofi Anan, brought the phenomenon of small arms proliferation 
to the forefront of UN’s agenda by noting as follows; The death toll from small arms dwarfs that of all other 
weapons systems -and in most years greatly exceeds the toll of atomic bombs that devastated Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. In terms of the carnage they cause small arms, indeed, could well be described as Weapon of Mass 
Destruction (WMD). Small arms proliferation is not merely a security issue: it is also an issue of human right 
and development. The proliferation of small arms sustains and exacerbates armed conflicts. It endangers peace 
keepers and workers. It undermines respect for international humanitarian laws. It threatens legitimate but weak, 
governments and it benefits terrorists as well as the perpetuators of organized crime (Kofi, 2010). Some of the 
old threats that assumed new dimensions include small arms and light weapons (SALW) proliferation, armed 
robbery, ethno-religious conflicts, militancy, assassinations, cultism, human trafficking, terrorism and 
kidnapping. Threats considered to be relatively new in Nigeria – though not without precedent, in the strict sense 
of it – are the outbreak of Islamic extremism and domestic terrorism, evident in the growing audacity of the 
“Boko Haram” sect including the 50th Independence Day (1 October 2010) twin bomb blasts in Abuja that killed 
12 people, the recent (14 April 2014) Nyanya motor park bombing that claimed more than 75 lives and injured 
several dozen others and the abduction of over 200 girls of GGSS in Chibok, Borno State the next day living the 
country in a state of insecurity.  A common denominator in the manifestation of both old and new threats is the 
use of SALWs. Thus, Nigeria now features prominently in the three-spot cline of transnational organised 
trafficking of SALWs in West Africa: origin, transit route and destination. Weapons in circulation in Nigeria 
come from local fabrication, residue of guns used during the civil war, thefts from government armouries, 
smuggling, dishonest government-accredited importers, ethnic militias, insurgents from neighbouring countries 
and some multinational oil corporations operating in the oil-rich but crisis-plagued Niger Delta. When and where 
these SALWs are deployed, human security has been the main victim. Studies indicate that guns are the weapons 
of choice for common crimes of insecurity. In Nigeria, small arms are predominant weapons of aggression. The 
most disturbing development that remains a source of worry to both academic and policy Analysts is the quality 
and quantity of weapons used in the execution of these crimes coupled with the attendant wanton destruction of 
life and property. There is the urgent need to re-examine the issue of small arms and light weapons proliferation 
and its implications on the national security of Nigeria. It was hoped that, at the end of the cold war, there will be 
a guaranteed worldwide optimism for international peace and security. A shift from super power proxy conflicts 
in the third world to socio-economic development appeared a viable project. It is disheartening to rediscover that, 
actual events in recent years have disastrously shattered those expectations. In place of enhanced security, 
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virulent internal insecurity accompanied by unprecedented civilian casualties and gross violation of human rights 
have emerged at an alarming rate. The local roots and causes of insecurity are numerous and diverse. However, 
in nearly all these cases, the diffusion of small arms has played a decisive role in the escalation, intensification 
and resolution of insecurity. 
In contrast to the conventional view inherited from the cold war era, emerging violence attest to the 
role of weapons as stimulus to insecurity and a harbinger of massive human rights violation and humanitarian 
crisis. In many cases, the availability of weapons has engendered national insecurity, which otherwise may not 
have occurred. The accessibility of small arms has been made an issue of choice. Illicit arms transfer is not a 
particular country’s problem, nor does the spread of deadly weapons stop at national borders. Guns and small 
arms are no longer the preserves of militias and police force but have fallen into the hands of ordinary criminals, 
terrorists, ethnic militias and death squads around the world. What is noteworthy is that while leaders and nations, 
given the experience of two world wars had concentrated on placing restrictions on the sale and transfer of big 
and conventional weapons, small arms proliferation was tragically ignored.   
 
CONCEPTUAL DISCOURSE 
According to Obasi (1999) a review of literature offers an opportunity to identify gaps in existing work and 
through identification of such limitations of new research problem worth investigating can be discovered. This 
work adopts the definition of SALWs provided by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
Convention. ‘Small arms’ refers to arms used by one person, and which include firearms and other destructive 
arms or devices such as exploding bombs, incendiary bombs or gas bombs, grenades, rocket launchers, missiles, 
missile systems or landmines; revolvers and pistols with automatic loading; rifles and carbines; machine guns; 
assault rifles; and light machine guns. ‘Light weapons’ are portable arms designed to be used by several persons 
working together in a team, and which include heavy machine guns, portable grenade launchers, mobile or 
mounted portable anti-aircraft cannons; portable anti-tank cannons, non-recoil guns; portable anti-tank missile 
launchers or rocket launchers; portable anti-aircraft missile launchers; and mortars with a calibre of less than 100 
millimetres. Although the concept of human security has gained currency recently, the idea is not fundamentally 
new. The ontological and epistemological assumptions that have underpinned previous orthodox security and 
policy formation simply did not recognize, include or value it. The word security emanated from the Greek word 
Se-Cura, meaning “to be in a state of no fear”. This state of being free from any threat within or without 
underscores the importance of putting in place actions and structures that can ensure the shelving of a people 
away from any harm. There is no doubt that security has been a subject that has attracted a rapidly growing 
interest and concern among the scholars in social sciences whereby a wide spectrum of issues on the subject – 
security has nevertheless been studied and new breakthroughs and findings have been made. The experience of 
the world in recent times emphasise a paradigm shift in security discourse. The specific term ‘national security’ 
was first officially introduced by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its 1994 Human 
Development Report. The report captured seven dimensions of the national security concept: economic security, 
food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political 
security. Two main aspects of national security are identified in the report: safety from chronic threats such as 
hunger, disease and repression; and protection from sudden disruptions in the pattern of daily life, whether in 
homes, jobs or communities. The conceptualization of security from the national security perspective represents 
a paradigmatic shift from orthodox security thinking, which privileges the protection of state power over an 
approach that accounts for the complex social and economic relations of its citizens. 
 National security is defined here as freedom from actual and potential threats to national life that may 
arise either as a result of human actions or inactions, or from natural disaster such as flood, earthquake, famine, 
drought, disease and other natural calamitous events resulting in death, human suffering and material damage. 
The emphasis on national security derives essentially from three fundamental convictions – namely the sanctity 
and inviolability of human life, the universality and dignity of human rights, and the existential imperatives of 
and value for individual safety in a world full of multifarious threats. National security is, therefore, rooted in 
three basic instincts: self-preservation, self-extension and self-fulfilment. By contributing to the disruption of the 
pattern of daily life at the individual, community and societal levels, the proliferation of SALWs plays a key role 
in denying people entitlement to these three core national values, central to the notion of national security. The 
word security according to BBC dictionary of English Language refers to all the precautions that are taken to 
protect a given location or place from danger…security is also a legal protection against possible harm or loss 
(BBC Dictionary, 1992, p.1048). The United Nations Development Programme (1994) posits that human 
security (an aspect of national security) refers to “freedom from fear and freedom from want”…“safety from 
chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression as well as protection from sudden and harmful disruptions 
in the patterns of daily life –whether in homes, in jobs or in communities.” 
Christopher (2011) however defines security as activities that ensure protection of a country, persons, 
and properties of the community against future threats, danger, mishaps and all other forms of perils. However, 
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Babangida (2011) views national security “as the physical protection and defence of our citizens and our 
territorial integrity, of which it is a part, but also the promotion of the economic wellbeing and prosperity of 
Nigerians in a safe and secure environment that promotes the attainment of our national interests and those of 
our foreign partners. Furthermore, Ngang (2012) asserts that “security means protection from hidden and hurtful 
disruptions in the patterns of daily life in homes, offices or communities… security must be related to the 
presence of peace, safety, happiness and the protection of human and physical resources or the absence of crisis, 
threats to human injury among others.” 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Most research is founded on a question that borders on a specific subject matter. Therefore, the researchers of 
this paper not only questions, but ponders and develops thoughts or theories on what the possible answers could 
be. These thoughts and theories are then grouped together into themes that frame the subject. This is what is 
known as a theoretical framework. It’s a process of identifying a core set of connectors within a topic and 
showing how they fit together or are related in some way to the subject in question.  This study is anchored on 
the combination of the theory of relative autonomy of the state and failed state theory. The state relative 
autonomy theory is situated within the ambit of the neo-Marxist political economy paradigm. The theory of 
relative state autonomy depicts the level or degree of detachment or aloofness of the state in the discharge of its 
duties such as mediating inter-class and intra-class struggles. Thus, this theory presupposes that in any state or 
political society, there are two levels of contradiction, namely primary contradiction and secondary contradiction. 
Primary contradiction is inter-class struggle or depicts class struggle between two antagonistic classes such as 
the ruling class and the ruled class or the bourgeois class and the proletariat (i.e. the working class). Whilst, 
secondary contradiction is the intra-class struggle, denoting class conflicts within the ruling-class or between 
different segments of the ruling-class. Marx and Engels demonstrate this intractable phenomenon of class 
struggle when they declare in the preface of their book, The Communist Manifesto that “the history of all the 
hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles” (Marx and Engels, 1977). The exponents of the theory 
hold that a state can exhibit either low or high relative autonomy. A state exhibits high autonomy when there is 
high commodification of capital or excessive penetration of capital into the economy such that the bourgeois 
class indulges in accumulation of capital through direct exploitation of the working class or appropriation of 
surplus value when they enter into social relationships of production (i.e. private capitalism). Here, the state is 
not interventionist, in other words, it does not intervene in the domestic economy like participating in the 
productive activities (i.e. public/state enterprises) or controlling or nationalizing means of production. The role 
of state here, therefore, is to regulate. As such, the state is relatively an impartial umpire meditating inter-class 
and intra-class struggles through harmonization and reconciliation of class interests. The developed capitalist 
states of the West are, therefore, considered to exemplify this high relative autonomy, and as a result, exhibit 
high level of human rights observance and protection Ake, (1976). Conversely, a state exhibits low autonomy 
when there is low commodification of capital or low penetration of (private) capital into the economy in such a 
way that the ruling class is constantly engage in primitive accumulation of capital through embezzlement of 
public fund. The state becomes the only avenue for capital accumulation. The state is thus, interventionist for 
engaging in productive activities of means of productive activities (i.e. public corporation) by nationalization of 
major means of production. This state does not limit itself to regulatory rule and is hence compromised, such that 
instead of rising above class struggle it is deeply immersed in it (Ake, 1981). The Nigerian state like other 
developing state exhibits a low level of the autonomy of the state as a result of low commodification of capital. 
Under the electric mixture of mixed economy, Nigeria experiences the phenomenon of lack of penetration of 
(private) capital into the economy creating a parasitic petty bourgeois class whose major source of accumulation 
of capital is the state. 
Hence, the Nigerian state becomes the only avenue for (primitive) accumulation of capital through 
which the governing class (i.e. petty bourgeoisie) produce and reproduce their dominance. The implication of the 
low autonomy of the Nigerian state is that it is immersed in the class struggle rather than rising above it leading 
to intense struggle for the control of the state for primitive accumulation and marginalization of everything (Ake, 
2001). According to Anyanwu (2005) the term “failed state” is often used to describe a state perceived as having 
failed at some of basic conditions and responsibilities of a sovereign government. A failed state is one that has 
shattered social and political structures. It is characterized by social, political and economic failure. Common 
characteristics of a failing state is when a central government is so weak or ineffective that it has little practical 
control over much of its territory, non-provision of public utilities or services, widespread corruption and 
criminality; refugees and involuntary movement of populations, and sharp economic decline. Anyanwu (2005) 
notes that failing states are invariably the product of a collapse of the power structures providing political 
supports for law and order, a process generally trigged and accompanied by anarchic forms of internal violence. 
It is the collapse of state institutions, especially the police and judiciary with resulting paralysis of governance, a 
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breakdown of law and order, and general banditry and chaos. Not only are the functions of government 
suspended, but its assets are destroyed or looted; and experienced officials are killed or flee the country. 
 
PROLIFERATION OF SALW IN NIGERIA: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The first small arms came into general use at the end of the 14th century. Initially they were nothing more than 
small cannon held in the hands, fired by placing a lighted match at the touch hole. Later a stock was added- the 
match lock and the first real handgun. Perhaps, gun possession by civilians in Nigeria today, is not a new and 
predates colonialism. Guns were introduced by the Europeans prior to colonialism during legitimate and 
illegitimate (slave) trade between them and Africans. Subsequently, guns and other arms, ammunition and 
weapons were used by Europeans to realize their imperial ambitions when they used force to suppress Africa’s 
resistance to European incursion, conquest and colonialism. The gunboat diplomacy was popularly employed by 
the British to compel African chiefs to enter into various treaties with them. There was establishment of West 
African Frontier Force (WAFF) used by the British which was used to execute the British-Aro War of (1901-
1902), and other forms of resistance in Nigeria, West Africa, and Africa. The role of Royal Niger Company 
(RNC) later United African Company (UAC) backed by British Government in using force to suppress 
dissenting communities is imperative (Chuma-Okoro, 2011). These arms or guns possibly found their ways to 
the hands of Africans during the period of colonialism subsequently used in tradition and hunting in the rural 
community. In no time, guns and gun powder became symbols of strength and power, and were later 
transformed into ceremonial weapons displayed during funerals, burials, ceremonies and customary festivals 
among the natives. They also became symbols of individual and ethnic grandeur, and for deterring aggressors 
and invaders. Today, guns are no longer just ornaments of prestige, or just for hunting, safari and expedition. 
Guns have transformed in terms of functionality, lethality, sophistication, ubiquity and motive of ownership. 
They have become more weapons of criminality and instruments of the underworld (Chuma- Okoro, 2011). 
Ostensibly, the 1959 Firearms Act was enacted to check the increasingly rate of arms proliferation in Nigeria 
towards independence. The failure of the Nigerian government to execute a comprehensive disarmament and 
arms destruction programme after the civil war (1967-1970) exacerbated the proliferation of guns and illicit arms 
trafficking. 
 
THE PROLIFERATION OF SALW IN NIGERIA: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Nigeria is a transit and destination of SALW. The proliferation of SALW is well documented in the literature, 
for examples, crime, revolts, subversion, sabotage, religious crisis, communal conflicts, social agitations, micro-
nationalism, insurrection, terrorism, insurgency, riots, militancy, electoral violence, political violence, social 
interest, ethnic tensions, cross border smuggling, porous borders, black marketeering, local manufacturing, 
privatization of security,  insecurity, poverty, economic crisis, mass unemployment, among others.  Out of an 
estimated 640 million SALW in circulation world-wide, 100 million are estimated to be Africa, about 30 million 
in sub-Saharan Africa and 8 million in West Africa alone and Over 70% of about eight to 10 million 
illegal weapons in West Africa are in Nigeria. As at 2002, the number of SALW in Nigeria was estimated by 
various reports and studies at between 1 and 3 million including arms in lawful possession of members of the 
armed forces and the police and those (majority) in the hands of civilians. The 80% of SALW in civilian 
possession were illegally acquired because of the strict regulations.  It is instructive to mention at this junction 
that SALW does not just move everywhere, but where they are demanded. Therefore, there are demand factors 
in the proliferation of SALW. Some of the scholars focus on the supply side or push factors of proliferation of 
SALW like willing sellers, lucrativeness, and porous borders while others concentrate on demand or pull factors 
like crime, violence, conflicts, riots and unrests (Ayissi and Sall (eds), 2005; Florquin and Berman (eds), 2005; 
Vines, 2005; Hazen and Horner (eds), 2007; Chuma-Okoro, 2011; Nte, 2011). Out of the 640 million small arms 
circulating globally, it is estimated that 100 million are found in Africa about 30 million in sub-Saharan Africa 
and 8 million in West Africa, alone. The majority of these SALW about 59% are in the hands of civilians, 38% 
are owned by government armed forces, 2.8 % by police and 0.2% by armed groups. The gun trade is worth $ 4 
billion annually, of which up to $ 1 billion may be unauthorized or illicit. Eight million new guns are 
manufactured every year by at least 1, 249 companies in 92 countries. Ten to 14 billion units of ammunition are 
manufactured every year enough to kill every person in the world twice over. African countries spent over 300 
billion dollars on armed conflict between 1990 and 2005 equalling the sum of international aid that was granted 
to Africa within the same period. An estimated 79% of small arms in Africa are in the hands of civilians 
(Ibrahim, 2003;  Nte, 2011). Between 1999 and 2003, there were over 30 communal clashes, sectarian violence 
and ethno-religious conflicts with each claiming hundreds of lives and properties, and internal displacement of 
women and children. 
The proliferation and use of SALW in ethno-religious clashes and armed robbery have killed more 
than 10,000 Nigerians, an average of 1000 people per year since 1999. The majority of casualties about 66% in 
Kano riot of 2004 were SALW victims sustaining permanent disabilities. Injuries due to SALW have increased 
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as much as ten-fold in urban Nigeria because most homicides are committed using SALW (John, Mohammed, 
Pinto and Nkanta, 2007; Nte, 2011). The problems of national security and proliferation of SALW are worsened 
by the inability of the police to reduce violent crime, ensure law and order and provide adequate security to the 
populace. None of the security agent currently possesses the training, resources or personnel to perform their 
duties effectively due to lengthy and porous nature of Nigerian borders (Hazen and Horner, 2007). Nte (2011) 
posits that there is a direct link between the acquisition of weapons like SALW and escalation conflicts into a 
full-brown war. The Nigerian state has made several efforts to check the proliferation of SALW but not from the 
demand side, or the root causes. Thus, most of these efforts had been superficial or superfluous. For example, the 
Nigerian government established National Commissions for the Control of the Proliferation and Unlawful 
Circulation of Light Weapons (NATCOM) for the implementation of the ECOWAS moratorium in July 2000 
less than two years after the agreement on the moratorium which was politically-binding moratorium on the 
importation, exportation and manufacture of small arms, later legally binding in 2006. A year later in July 2001, 
the NATCOM publicly destroyed a stockpile of arms and ammunition seized by the security forces in which a 
total of 1,257 weapons worth 50 million Naira were destroyed. Among the weapons destroyed were 428 rifles, 
494 imported pistols and 287 locally made pistols. These unlawful weapons were seized by the security forces 
between 1998 and 2011. In September 2001, a request by the NATCOM for the suspension of the granting of 
licences to carry weapons by police representatives was accepted (Aderinwale, 2005; Ocheche, 2005). Nigerian 
government played a prominent role in the adoption of the Declaration of a Moratorium on Importation, 
Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa signed on October 31, 1998 in Abuja, Nigeria 
renewable for a period of three years later extended in 2001. On December 1999, the ECOWAS member states 
adopted a code of conduct for implementation of the Moratorium. The Programme for Coordination and 
Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) was established with assistance from UNDP (Ndime, 
2005). The Nigerian government has also entered into bilateral cooperation with its neighbours, Benin Republic, 
Niger, Chad and Cameroon. They have taken a number of measures to boost cross-border cooperation and 
enhance security at the borders. These measures include the establishment of joint commissions like Chad-
Nigeria Joint Commission, Niger-Nigeria Joint Commission, Benin-Nigeria Joint Commission, Cameroon-
Nigeria Joint Commission, Lake Chad Basin Commission and joint border patrols between Nigeria and Republic 
of Benin (Adejo, 2005).  Nigeria is a signatory to a number of international measures to curb SALW 
proliferation. It supported the adoption in 2005 of the international instrument to Enable States to Identify and 
Trace Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, and has argued that political document needs to be transformed 
into a legally binding instrument in order to control effectively and criminalize the illicit movement of SALW.   
At the regional level, Nigeria has supported ECOWAS measures aimed at reducing the proliferation of SALW. 
At the global level, Nigeria is a signatory to the United Nations (UN) Firearms Protocol on November 13, 2001; 
which it ratified on July 15, 2004 (Vines, 2005;  Hazen and Horner, 2007). Nigeria supported the extension of 
ECOWAS Moratorium in October 2004 for the second time and the agreement to strengthen it by transforming it 
into a legally binding convention. 
At the national level, Nigeria continues to rely on the National Firearms Act of 1959 as the legal 
instrument governing small arms possession, manufacture and the use in the country as amended even though the 
Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Decree No.5 was promulgated in 1984 and later the Robbery and 
Firearms (Special Provisions) Act. In July 2000, the Nigerian government proposed and established a National 
Committee on the Proliferation and Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons the purpose of which 
was to determine the sourcing illegal small arms and collect information on small arms proliferation in Nigeria. 
In May 2001, the government established a second committee aimed at implementing the 1998 ECOWAS 
Moratorium. These two committees were later merged into a single committee. The committee has accomplished 
very little in the past five years in large part due to lack of political will, financial support, technical expertise, 
and institutional capacity. In other words, NATCOM was incapacitated by underfunding, corruption on the part 
of law enforcement agencies. There were renewed efforts in 2007 to revive the activities of the Committee and 
legislation is being written to convert the Committee into a national commission.  It requested support from the 
ECOWAS Small Arms Programme to conduct the survey and to undertake other activities in support of the 
implementation of the 2006 ECOWAS Convention (Hazen and Horner, 2007). Inaugurated in 2001, the 
NATCOM is responsible for the registration and control of SALW, and granting of permits for exemptions under 
the ECOWAS Moratorium (Chuma-Okoro, 2011). Despite these national-efforts, the rate of accumulation of 
SALW is increasing and becoming endemic as various forms of violence and casualties are in the recent times 
recorded in the Northern part of Nigeria.   There is lack of capacity and strong legal or effective institutional 
frameworks to regulate SALW and combat the phenomenon of SALW proliferation in Nigeria, particularly 
Northern part of Nigeria (Chuma-Okoro, 2011). More fundamentally, the Nigerian state is yet to deal with the 
demand factors of SALW proliferation preferring to dwell on the symptoms rather than the root causes. The 
demand factors are the root causes of SALW proliferation, because if there is no demand, there will not be 
supply. For instance, the Amnesty initiative saw over 15 000 militants surrender arms at the expiration of the DD 
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phase of the Amnesty. Weapons recovered during the disarmament process included 2 760 assorted guns, 287 
445 ammunitions of different calibre, 18 gun-boats, 763 dynamite sticks, 1 090 dynamite caps, 3 155 magazines 
and several other military accessories, such as dynamite cables, bulletproof jackets and jack-knives. It is widely 
believed that militants only surrendered a small fraction of their arms, as most of them doubted the government’s 
genuine commitment to the amnesty. 
The regular interception of illegal arms trafficking within and across the borders by security agencies 
also reveals the worrisome dimension that arms proliferation has recently assumed in the country. The media is 
awash with frightening reports of sophisticated SALWs being seized by security operatives either at ports, 
borders, highways or crime and conflict scenes. ”. On July 9, 2007, about 4.30pm, a Delta state police team 
arrested a Warrant Officer (WO2) serving with the Nigerian Air Force 33 Logistic section in Makurdi, Benue 
State, while transferring arms to a location in the Niger Delta. In his Toyota Corolla car with registration No. 
AJ41 MKD, there were 5 assault rifles, 449 rounds of AK47 live ammunition, 4 brand new live jackets and 5 
empty magazines. When the police interrogated the air force officer turned arms dealer, he mentioned the name 
of a senator as being the owner of the weapons and that the arms are from the Republic of Chad .(Bestman 
Wellington, 2006.)  In August 2010, security agents in Maiduguri also arrested a commercial driver carrying 25 
AK-47 rifles and hundreds of rounds of ammunition in a Peugeot 504 vehicle. These arms, allegedly smuggled 
into the country from Cameroon, were destined for Jos – where cascading ethno-religious violence has caused 
serious devastation in human and material terms. In November 2010, a woman identified as Lucy Danagana was 
intercepted at Dabar Masara, Borno State, trying to smuggle 10 AK-47 rifles from Chad Republic into Nigeria. 
She entered Nigeria from Chad through Kofia in Cameroon via a boat. Around the same period, the police in 
Ibadan, Oyo State, intercepted a large cache of arms and ammunition from a suspected bank robbery squad. The 
seized arms and ammunitions included 47 rifles, 103 AK-47 rifle magazines, one assault rifle magazine, 2,540 
AK-47 rounds of ammunition, 727 general purpose machine gun (GPMG) rounds of ammunition, three chain 
bullets, explosive materials, two GPMGs and one chisel (a tool with a characteristically shaped cutting edge). 
A high-profile interdict was recorded in October 2010 when a combined team of security agents impounded 13 
containers loaded with various sizes of grenades, rocket launchers, explosives, assault rifles, heavy machine guns 
and ammunition at Apapa Wharf in Lagos, Nigeria. The containers were aboard a vessel – MV CMA-CGM 
Everest – from Iran and were destined for The Gambia in West Africa. This discovery came a few weeks after 
the National Task Force to Combat Illegal Importation of Goods, Small Arms, Ammunition and Light Weapons 
(NATFORCE) had, on 18 October 2010, impounded a lorry load of arms and ammunition in Onitsha, Anambra 
State. Nigeria’s problem with SALWs is also traceable to the civil war (1967–1970), during which the south-east 
made a failed attempt to secede. Deminers Concept Nigeria Limited – a company involved in the enumeration of 
mine victims, identification and marking of unexploded ordinances and demining exercises in the south-east of 
Nigeria – has revealed that it recovered over 17 000 unexploded bombs from the zone. An estimated 300 
unexploded bombs and improvised explosive devices are still believed to be buried in the region. These 
unrecovered explosive remnants of war still pose a threat to human security, especially for women and children 
that farm in the area.  For example, a major and five other soldiers of the Nigerian Army were convicted in 
November 2008 of selling over 7,000 arms [valued at over 100 million Nigerian naira] – including AK-47 rifles, 
rocket launchers and machine guns – to Niger Delta militants between January 2000 and December 2006. These 
arms were stolen from the depots of the Nigerian Army at the Command and Staff College, Jaji, and the One 
Base Ordnance, Kaduna. 
 
SALW PROLIFERATION VESUS NATIONAL SECURITY IN NIGERIA 
Although Nigeria’s problem with SALWs is not new, its increasing availability in the last decade has helped 
stoke a wave of insurgencies, ethno-religious conflicts, cross-border banditry, kidnapping, armed robbery and 
other violent crimes. Arms build-up has fuelled violence in different parts of Nigeria – especially communal 
clashes and ethno-religious conflicts. Between 1999 and April 2010, Nigeria recorded at least 187 ethno-
religious conflicts, leading to the death of several thousands of people. These weapons helped to prolong 
conflicts, induced huge internal population displacement, undermined social peace and devastated the economic 
livelihoods of individuals and communities. As a result of recurrent violent conflicts, Nigeria is faced with the 
Herculean task of responding to a fluctuating but always sizeable number of internally displaced persons (IDPs). 
Between 2000 and 2002, for instance, an estimated 1,713,306 persons were displaced by ethno-religious 
conflicts and, by June 2013, some 1.6 million Nigerians are estimated to have been internally displaced. The 
January 2010 crisis in Jos displaced over 40,000 persons. Situations of internal displacement undermine human 
security at individual and community levels. IDPs are usually vulnerable to violent crimes like robbery and rape, 
and are prone to contracting contagious diseases, due to poor sanitary conditions at the (re)settlement centres. 
The impact of Nigeria’s SALWs problem on human security is also evident in financial losses induced by 
conflicts. About 10 major ethno-religious conflicts between 1999 and 2004 cost the Nigerian government over 
400 million naira (US$2.86 million). Besides, the amount of money that governments spend on security during 
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such crises and their aftermath are huge. In the aftermath of the Jos crisis in early 2010, the federal government 
assisted the Bauchi State government with ₦135 million (US$900 000) to help resettle or integrate about 30,000 
IDPs from neighbouring Plateau State seeking refuge in Bauchi State. These scarce resources could otherwise be 
used in providing basic services that promote human security and development, such as clean water, education 
and healthcare, among others. Beyond the cost to government, individuals lose property and family members. 
The loss of property compounds the problem of poverty and deprivation of the affected population. Through the 
death of family members, arms induced conflicts lead to a deep fracturing of kinship and family structures – 
many children have been left without parents, husbands without wives, and vice versa. When a family unit is 
dismantled, children suffer and their future wellbeing is often bleak, as they are denied good parental care. Many 
end up as social miscreants who contribute to violent crimes. Thus, for every person killed or injured in conflict 
and crime involving the use of SALWs, there are many more who must cope with the psychological, physical 
and economic effects that endure in the aftermath. In this context, women and children are invariably the hardest 
hit. In recent times, SALWs proliferation has led to an increase in violent crimes that undermine human security, 
such as rape, cultism, armed robbery and kidnapping, in most parts of the country. 
 
  
Source: International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) and Arms Survey, Geneva. 
  
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
A successful resolution of the SALW conundrum in Nigeria requires a holistic approach that addresses the 
underlying factors creating the demand for SALW and the sources of supply, rather than treating the SALW 
problem as an independent or a compartmentalized issue. Furthermore, because armed violence is also a socio-
economic issue, there is a much larger group of stakeholders and appropriate responses beyond law makers and 
law enforcers. 
As earlier noted, the demand and supply factors of SALW proliferation are mutually dependent. 
Therefore, addressing one without the other may not produce the desired results. For instance, addressing the 
supply factor without simultaneously addressing the demand end may create a situation where arms become 
more expensive to acquire without necessarily preventing their acquisition, since those acquiring it may still be 
able to afford it. An effective approach requires coordinated and sustained legislative, administrative and judicial 
strategies that address the factors encouraging demand for arms and concurrently dam the outlets through which 
illicit arms are proliferated. The strategies should go beyond the national level because of the cross-border 
implications of SALW. The proliferation of SALWs is posing a grave threat to security and development in 
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Nigeria. These arms should be cleaned up if the country is to achieve a measurable degree of security of life and 
property. There is, therefore, the need for the Nigerian government to pursue a robust strategy that could reduced 
if not eradicate the menace. The following intervention mechanisms are recommended to include: 
• The Nigerian government should encapsulates, strengthen institutions and processes of governance to enhance 
social provisioning for its citizens, who are becoming increasingly frustrated over governance failure, thereby 
resorting to violent crimes that increase demand for  SALW and it must also extends to  an aggressive job 
creation programme for Nigeria’s teeming and idle youths who are as a result become hopeless. 
• There is a need for interventions at the national, state and local levels to be strengthened and promote peaceful 
coexistence amongst the diverse ethno-religious and political groups in Nigeria. This would help minimize the 
outbreak and persistence of violent conflicts that stoke arms proliferation. 
• The National Orientation Agency should partner with credible civil society organizations (CSOs) and the 
media to mount enlightenment and orientation programmes on the practice of security situation awareness or 
security consciousness critical to crime prevention. This will enable people to appreciate the importance of 
monitoring developments around them and to report unwholesome activities (arms trafficking) to security 
agencies. 
• Adoption of a national arms control strategy (NACS) to guide the clean-up and prevention of SALWs 
circulation. The proposed establishment of a National Commission on the Control of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons (NATCOM) should be fast-tracked to lead this effort, involving collaboration with CSOs, 
NATFORCE and other stakeholders. 
• Implementation of effective collaborative mechanisms between security agencies and border communities to 
enhance information sharing on activities along the borders. 
• The strengthening of border security arrangements through enhanced intra- and inter-state collaboration among 
security and intelligence agencies in maritime and land border areas, to ensure effective tracking and interdiction 
of SALWs traffickers. 
• Robust funding and provision of equipment for security agencies, including security posts at the nation’s entry 
points: land, sea and airports. 




 Adejo, P.Y. (2005) “Crime and Cross-Border Movement of Weapons: The Case of Nigeria” in A. Ayissi and I, 
Sall (eds), Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa: Handbook 
for the Training of Armed and Security Forces, Geneva: United Nations Institute of Disarmament 
Research (UNIDIR). 
Aderinwale, A. (2005) “Civil Society and the Fight against the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons” 
Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa: Handbook for the 
Training of Armed and Security Forces, Geneva: United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research 
(UNIDIR). 
Ake, C. (1981) A Political Economy of Africa, London: Longman Group. 
Ake, C. (1985) Political Economy of Nigeria, London: Longman Group. 
Ake, C. (2001) Democracy and Development in Africa, Ibadan: Spectrum Books. 
Anyanwu, U. (2005) “Failed States in Africa: The Nigerian Case since 1960” American Journal of International 
Politics and Development Studies (AJIPDS) Vol.1, No. 1. 
Ayissi, A. and Sall, I. (eds) (2005) Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West 
Africa: Handbook for the Training of Armed and Security Forces, Geneva: United Nations Institute of 
Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). 
Bestman W, (2006) “Weapons of War in the Niger Delta” IIRIN, May 2006, quoted in Bestman Wellington’s 
article, “Weapons of war in The Niger Delta” 
Christopher L. (2011). The social Impacts of Light Weapons Availability and Proliferation, International Alert. 
A Discussion paper for UNIDIR. 
 Chuma-Okoro, H. (2011) “Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Nigeria: Legal Implications” in 
Law and Security in Nigeria. 
 Florquin, N. and Berman, E. G. (eds) (2005) Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in 
the ECOWAS Regions, Geneva: Small Arms Survey Publication. 
Hazen, J. M. and Horner, J. (2007) “Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in 
Perspective” The Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper 20.Ibrahim, M. (2003) Democracy and the 
Menace of small Arms of Small Arms proliferation in Nigeria, Lagos: Centre for Democracy and 
Development. 
International Affairs and Global Strategy                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 




John, I. A. Mohammed, A. Z; Pinto, A. D and Nkanta, C. A. (2007). Gun Violence in Nigeria: A focus on ethno 
religious conflict in Kano, Journal of Public Health Policy 28, 420-431 
 Kofi, A.  (2010) ,Millennium report to UN General Assembly (UNGA), New York, USA. 
 Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1977) Manifesto of the Communist Party, Moscow: Progress Publishers. 
Ndime, D. (2005) “Corporation between States to Combat the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons” 
in A. Ayissi and I. Sall (eds) Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West 
Africa: Handbook for the Training of Armed and Security Forces, Geneva: United Nations Institute of 
Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). 
Ngang, C. K. (2002). Small Arms and Light Weapons, Africa’s True WMDs: The Role of SALW in Conflict and 
Insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa ,MA Thesis, European University Center for Peace Studies (EPU), 
Stadstschlaining, Austria  
 Nte, N.D. (2011) “The Changing Patterns of Small and Light Weapons (SALW) Proliferation and the 
Challenges of National Security in Nigeria”, Global Journal of Africa Studies 1 (1): 5-2 
Obasi, I. N. (1999) Research Methodology in Political Science, Enugu: Academic Publishing Company. 
Ocheche, S. (2005) “Cooperating with Civilians and the Security Forces in Efforts to Combat the Proliferation of 
Small Arms and Light Weapons” in A. Ayissi and I. Sall (eds) Combating the Proliferation of Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa: Handbook for the Training of Armed and Security Forces, 
Geneva: United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). 
 UNDP (2004), Human Development Report 1994. New York: Oxford University Press, p.22. 
  
  
The IISTE is a pioneer in the Open-Access hosting service and academic event management.  
The aim of the firm is Accelerating Global Knowledge Sharing. 
 
More information about the firm can be found on the homepage:  
http://www.iiste.org 
 
CALL FOR JOURNAL PAPERS 
There are more than 30 peer-reviewed academic journals hosted under the hosting platform.   
Prospective authors of journals can find the submission instruction on the following 
page: http://www.iiste.org/journals/  All the journals articles are available online to the 
readers all over the world without financial, legal, or technical barriers other than those 
inseparable from gaining access to the internet itself.  Paper version of the journals is also 
available upon request of readers and authors.  
 
MORE RESOURCES 
Book publication information: http://www.iiste.org/book/ 
Academic conference: http://www.iiste.org/conference/upcoming-conferences-call-for-paper/  
 
IISTE Knowledge Sharing Partners 
EBSCO, Index Copernicus, Ulrich's Periodicals Directory, JournalTOCS, PKP Open 
Archives Harvester, Bielefeld Academic Search Engine, Elektronische Zeitschriftenbibliothek 
EZB, Open J-Gate, OCLC WorldCat, Universe Digtial Library , NewJour, Google Scholar 
 
 
